I. INTRODUCTION
In this progressive era of #MeToo and other movements which highlight the reality of women's experiences in the workplace and other settings, the question arises as to why discrimination-based civil lawsuits are not more successful for female litigants. The courts have served as an important tool in reforming discriminatory workplace cultures by directly addressing and punishing overtly discriminatory workplace behavior such as blatant pregnancy and gender discrimination 1 or grievous acts of sexual harassment. 2 But the same courts have not been able to function as a safe haven for women who have their careers curtailed by implicit bias-based gender 3 discrimination brought under Title VII. 4 Gender discrimination lawsuits brought under a theory of bias-based discrimination have not offered reliable remedies for female litigants and have not positively impacted workplace culture in any meaningful way.
Bias-based gender discrimination theory involves structural discrimination-facially neutral * Catherine Ross Dunham is a Professor of Law at the Elon University School of Law. She is an expert in the areas of civil procedure and class action litigation and has written and spoken on issues related to gender bias and pay equity. Dr. Christopher Leupold is an Associate Professor of Psychology at Elon University. The authors are especially grateful to Lisa Watson, J.D., M.L.S.. for research and other technical assistance. 57, 57 (1986) . 3 The term gender as used in this Article is intended to refer to all people identifying as female and is not intended to limit the discussion of gender-based discrimination to persons who possess a female reproductive system and secondary sex characteristics. 4 Generation Discrimination, creating a framework for the research to follow. Part III describes and explains the relevant research by outlining the parameters of the sample, explaining the statistical method followed, and discussing the research results. Finally, Part IV analyzes the results of the authors' research and theorizes how the authors' findings can inform future discussions of gender discrimination.
II. THE BACKGROUND: IMPLICIT BIAS-BASED GENDER DISCRIMINATION
Second Generation Discrimination, also known as structural discrimination, is a theory of implicit bias-based gender discrimination available to female plaintiffs seeking relief for workplace discrimination under Title VII.
11 Second Generation Discrimination theory argues implicit bias among supervisors or managers, those persons holding higher positions in the workplace hierarchy, leads to policies which favor the majority demographics, typically white and male, 12 thereby excluding women from opportunities for advancement. 13 The theory argues that gender-based discrimination flows from "ongoing patterns of interaction shaped by organizational culture." 14 The interactions, particularly those interactions between male employees, influence access, workplace conditions, and opportunities for advancement over time. 15 If the group that controls access, conditions, and opportunities is all male, that group will begin to define "fit" and "success" in terms of those who fit and are successful in the workplace environment. 16 The result indicate the federal judge's political party affiliation. The sample was created based on available demographic information, thus actual political party affiliation or affinity at the time of the judicial decision in the sample was not determined. The term "political affiliation" as used here indicates only the political party of the Presidential appointer. 11 See generally Sturm, supra note 5. 12 Id. 13 Id.; see also Dunham, supra note 7, at 77. 14 Sturm, supra note 5, at 470. 15 Id. at 471. 16 Id. at 470-74; see also Benjamin Artz et al., Do Women Ask? 57 INDUS. REL. 611 (2018) (concluding that women do ask for salary increases but receive less, which challenges the general hypothesis that women do not ask because they are worried about workplace relationships).
is that traits deemed as masculine will take on a positive cast in the workplace, whereas traits deemed as more feminine will be unusual, misunderstood, and devalued in a male-dominated workplace environment. 17 The bias-based culture works to affirm gender stereotypes, thus confirming the biases of male workers-whether conscious or unconscious-and leading to a discriminatory workplace environment for women who attempt to join or advance.
18
Second Generation Discrimination recognizes three co-dependent constructs which work together to create a culture of workplace discrimination. 19 First, the workplace utilizes a faciallyneutral policy, in which the bias-based discrimination violates a "norm of functional, as opposed to formal, equality of treatment" by applying a facially-neutral practice or policy to a group of similarly situated employees. 20 The second construct contemplates the effect of formal policies on the dominant group, evaluating whether a workplace policy violates a norm of equal access. 21 The third construct contemplates stereotype and bias, analyzing the effect of using sex stereotyping to exclude. 22 These three constructs create a self-perpetuating cycle of discriminatory policies and actions.
23
The third construct doubles back to the first, and a continuum of unchecked bias develops:
facially-neutral formal policies develop, the formal policies are applied disproportionately based on the gender demographics of the subject group of employees, the female employees have restricted access under the formal policies, the male employees access management as a favored dominant group, and the male-dominated manager group is allowed to employ discretion based on sex stereotypes unchecked by a formal corporate practice. 24 This interplay among the three constructs creates a continuum wherein the result is a continuous culture of bias and discrimination. Although overt gender discrimination has been successfully challenged, the implicit biasbased species of gender discrimination understood as Second Generation Discrimination has endured despite legal challenges. 27 One theory for why Second Generation cases have not been more successful is the complexity of the claims themselves. 28 In stating a Second Generation Discrimination claim, the implicit bias-based nature of the claim must be understood by the trial judge first, then the jury, and then, possibly, appellate courts. 29 The necessary understanding must be more than intellectual, as the very nature of the discrimination claim rests in human behavior that operates at an unconscious level.
30
The Second Generation Discrimination Continuum depicts a cycle of bias-based behaviors that self-perpetuates and creates environments that offer few opportunities for change. 31 A similar cycle has evolved in the court's review of implicit bias-based gender discrimination cases. 32 The federal judiciary is predominantly male and over 50, meaning that those presiding over motions to dismiss are less likely to possess the experiences and information that is necessary to facilitate a full understanding of Second Generation Discrimination. 33 The dynamics of judging and the demographics of the judiciary create another obstacle to reliefThird Generation Discrimination.
34
The Third Generation Discrimination Continuum (Figure 1. 
2)
Like the theory of Second Generation Discrimination, Third Generation Discrimination also operates on a continuum that can proceed without interruption if certain factors are present.
35
Consider a hypothetical case where the gravamen of the female plaintiff's claim is that she was (2005)) ("In the context of gender stereotypes, children are likely to learn at an early age that men are 'competent, rational, assertive, independent, objective, and self-confident,' and women are 'emotional, submissive, dependent, tactful, and gentle.'" the plaintiff's claim as not plausible. 42 If so, the facially-neutral rule, Rule 12(b)(6), has been interpreted to favor the employer-defendant, illustrating Phase II of the Continuum.
43
Finally, assume the plaintiff appeals the trial judge's ruling dismissing her case. The plaintiff-appellant is now asking the appellate judiciary to assess the lower court's action, which requires the appellate court to assess de novo the plausibility of the claim. 44 If the appellate court affirms the lower court, this new interpretation of Rule 12(b)(6) can perpetuate a general misunderstanding of the Second Generation Discrimination claim and weaken the availability of the theory for other litigants. 45 The cycle will then repeat, as the first case becomes precedent for the next, diminishing the viability of bias-based gender discrimination litigation and validating the suspect employment practice.
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To test the theory of Third Generation Discrimination, which is predicated on the idea that judicial traits and experiences impact the litigant's success in Title VII litigation, the authors studied Title VII cases brought in federal district courts for a ten year period. 47 The study was designed to test the relationships between case outcomes at the dispositive motion stage and certain In discussing a study on social judgeability, the authors note that because participants in the study had received no individuating information about the study subjects, the study participants tended to judge the subjects in accordance with their schemas, or categorical information, about the subjects, basing their judgments on general, categorical information about comedians and archivists. . 46 See supra Figure 1 .2 p. 7. 47 For readers who are interested in obtaining the complete data file, please contact the first author.
demographic traits of the deciding judge. 48 Specifically, the authors studied whether a judge's gender, race, age, and political affiliation impacts a judge's rulings on dispositive motions in Title VII gender discrimination claims. 49 As is discussed below, the authors determined that age was the most influential demographic trait in determining the success of a female plaintiff's gender discrimination claim.
III. THE RESEARCH: SAMPLE, METHOD, AND RESULTS
The research sample of 160 cases was derived from a comprehensive research pool which included 1014 federal cases decided between January 1, 2008 through April 30, 2018. The research focused on claims filed under Title VII based on allegations of gender discrimination in the workplace. 51 The full research pool was narrowed to focus on cases wherein a single judge made a dispositive ruling, such as a ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or a motion for summary judgment, and included a written opinion addressing the strengths and weaknesses of the Title VII gender discrimination claim. 52 The sample includes cases premised on allegations of overt discrimination, sexual harassment, and implicit bias-based discrimination and includes cases wherein the Federal Title VII claims are joined with other state and federal claims of discrimination. Cases included in the sample were coded as either favoring the plaintiff(s) or favoring the defendant(s). 53 Data was also gathered on the age, gender, race, and political 48 See infra pp. 11. 49 Id. 50 See infra pp. 25-28. 51 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.") (emphasis added). 52 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 53 See infra p. 14.
affiliation of the judge making the dispositive ruling for each case included in the sample.
54
A. THE RESEARCH SAMPLE Searches for case law sought federal cases from January 1, 2008 through April 1, 2018, including case law from all federal district courts and courts of appeal for all federal circuits.
55
Searches focused on the terms "gender discrimination" and "sex discrimination" 56 combined with searches for cases filed under Title VII and related federal law addressing sex discrimination in the workplace. 57 Searches also included the terms "bias," "implicit bias" 58 but eliminated biasbased gender discrimination claims not arising in the workplace context.
59
In determining which cases from those surveyed would be included in the research sample, the authors employed the following parameters in narrowing the case law to those cases most relevant to a study of the theory of Third Generation Discrimination.
60
• The case law included in the sample includes claims by female plaintiffs asserting discrimination based on sex as prohibited by Title VII. 61 This description includes cases for: disparate treatment 62 and disparate impact 63 discrimination; sexual harassment; quid 54 See supra note 10; see also infra p. 20. 55 The authors included federal appeals court cases in the research inquiries but did not include appellate cases in the sample as the appellate opinions had multiple authors or were per curium, thus not offering a reasonable basis on which to compare judicial demographics to outcomes. 56 The actual search terms used were: "SY((sex! or gender /5 discrimination)) % "title ix" then narrowed to aft pro quo sexual harassment; and hostile environment. 64 The sample also includes gender discrimination cases grounded in pregnancy discrimination.
65
• The sample includes cases of gender discrimination wherein the plaintiff's claims are combined with allegations of race, age or other actionable discrimination. 66 In reviewing those cases, the analysis focused on the gender discrimination claims. Cases where the gender discrimination claims could not be separated from other discrimination claims were excluded from the sample.
• The sample does not include gender discrimination cases where the allegations of discrimination focused on allegations of discrimination based on sexual orientation, including allegations of discrimination based on transgender status.
67
• The sample does not include gender discrimination cases where the lead plaintiff is a heterosexual male arguing he was discriminated against based on his gender.
68
• The sample does not include gender discrimination cases wherein the Title VII sex discrimination claims are not the factual gravamen of the discrimination claim. sexual harassment "…a plaintiff must assert and prove (1) that the employee was a member of a protected class; (2) that the employee was subjected to unwelcomed sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances or requests for sexual favors; (3) that the harassment complained of was based on sex; (4) that the employee's submission to the unwelcomed advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job benefits or that the employee's refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands resulted in a tangible job detriment; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability. To state a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment, a plaintiff must show that "(1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment created a hostile work environment; and (5) • The sample includes only cases brought in federal court under Title VII, thus under federal question subject matter jurisdiction. 70 The sample includes cases that combine Title VII claims with similar state law provisions.
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• The sample includes cases where the legal and factual analysis is based on a dispositive motion, 72 thus requiring the court to fully analyze the pleadings and/or facts and consider whether the case should proceed in litigation.
73
• The sample does not include cases wherein the court is examining damages awards following a trial, motions for a new trial, or any other post-verdict review.
In addition to using the above-noted parameters to narrow the full research results to a workable study sample, the authors also employed a coding process to determine whether cases in the sample favored the plaintiff or the defendant. The goal of the coding was to allow for comparison between the outcome of the case and the demographics of the presiding judge, creating a set of outcome demographics for purposes of the statistical method. 74 As the cases in the sample represent complex litigation involving multiple issues of fact and law, including state and federal law, the coding was based on a determination of whether any of the plaintiffs' gender discrimination claims were allowed to proceed to the next step of litigation. 75 If any gender discrimination claim was allowed to proceed, the case was coded as "favoring plaintiff. 72 Specifically, the sample includes cases evaluated per motions to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), FED. R. CIV. P. 56 and FED. R. CIV. P. 50. The sample also includes cases evaluating a motion to certify a class under FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Cases which raise other evidentiary and procedural issues were not included in the sample or were evaluated only in regards to the parts which addressed other dispositive motions. 73 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (a complaint must include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief) and FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (summary judgment may only be granted if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law). 74 See infra p. 20. 75 Id. (the authors coded case outcomes as "favoring plaintiff" based on any ruling which allowed a plaintiff to proceed past the preliminary motion stage in a gender discrimination claim, including cases where the plaintiff could proceed under state law).
court's ruling did not allow any gender discrimination claim to move forward, the case was coded as "favoring defendant."
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At times, the coding determination was complex. For example, in cases where the procedural issue was based on a motion to dismiss per Rule 12(b)(6), the case was coded as "favoring plaintiff" if the gender discrimination claim challenged in the motion was allowed to proceed past the pleading stage. 77 As cases at this procedural posture are in the nascent stages of litigation, the "favoring plaintiff" code does not necessarily indicate the ultimate success of the plaintiff's case. 78 Likewise, a denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment on a gender discrimination claim does not indicate the plaintiff's ultimate success on the claim. 79 However, the focus of this research was to assess whether a relationship existed between cases which recognized the viability of a gender discrimination claim and the demographics of the judge presiding on the dispositive motion. 80 A focus on the ultimate outcome of the case would necessarily involve studying the final determination of a fact-finder, judge or jury, which is less likely to generate a written opinion explaining the reasons for the outcome and less likely to relate specifically to the relevant traits of the fact-finder.
B. THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The selection procedure described above resulted in a total of 160 cases for subsequent analysis. For each case, data was gathered on the presiding judge's gender, race, age at time of 76 Id. (the authors coded case outcomes as "favoring defendant" if all the gender discrimination claims were dismissed at the motion stage, thus foreclosing the plaintiff from litigating the gender discrimination issues in the studied case 110 The statistical test performed was a Chi-square analysis with the following notation: X 2 (4, N=160) = 7.09, p=.13).
The value, 7.09, failed to achieve a threshold that would indicate that the predictors did explain the outcome at a statistically significant level. 111 The standard criterion level for statistical significance is p<.05. If an analysis produces a p-value, or probability value, that is equal to or greater than .05, the result is deemed not statistically significant; significance is only achieved when a p-value is less than .05. In this analysis, p=.13, which is greater than .05 thus deeming it not statistically significant. 112 Id. 113 Researchers determine the p-value they will use as a criterion for statistical significance prior to analyses. The convention is p<.05. Depending on the nature of the study, researchers can make it easier to attain statistical significance by increasing the p-value to .10. It is not typical to use a p-value of .10 in social science research, but permissible in early exploratory research. However, statistical significance at the .10 level is not as convincing as it is at the .05 level and is rarely used to make definitive conclusions about a finding.
could be made for the current study, the observed p=.13 still exceeds that criterion. 114 In essence, the overall equation for the model generated suggests that, even though there might be some subtle relationships between the predictors and dispositional outcome, they are at best tenuous and statistically nonsignificant. 115 Peng et al. recommend next examining the overall goodness of fit for the generated model. 116 Nagelkerke's R-Square, which is one of the most often-used indicators 117 of the relative magnitude of the model's predictive ability, had a value of .06. 118 As Nagelkerke's R-Square can range from 0 to 1.0, a value of .06 indicates that the extent to which the set of variables are predicting the dispositional outcome is fairly small.
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Although it is informative, Peng et al. suggest using Nagelkerke's R-Square value as a supplementary indicator to be complemented by the other analyses. 120 
Peng et al. cite Hosmer and
Lemeshow who state that among the various statistical outputs generated by binary logistic regression, "…the classification table is the most appropriate when classification is a stated goal of the analysis." 121 As the current study's focus is on classification of judge's dispositions, the 114 As the p-value here was .13, it is 'closer' to the .10 criterion than the .05 one; i.e., it would have been 'closer' to being statistically significant. However, even still, the result would not be significant if a .10 criterion were used. 115 Statistical significance is a function of multiple factors (e.g., sample size, variability, random error and chance) as well as the observed patterns in the data. As a result, there might be patterns in the data that suggest a relationship exists but it may still fail to achieve statistical significance because these other factors. For example, if the same patterns observed in this data were present in a sample of 10,000 instead of 160, the result might be statistically significant. However, statistical significance can ultimately only be determined for a given result based on these factors as they exist in the study as it was actually performed. 118 In ordinary least squares multiple regression, the commonly reported R-Square statistic refers to the amount of variance in the outcome that is explained by predictor(s). Although conceptually different, Nagelkerke's R-Square is a variation of this from a 'fit' perspective.
119 As with R-Square, a Nagelkerke's R-Square of 1.0 would indicate that the set of variables perfectly predicted an outcome; a value of 0 would indicate that the set of variables had absolutely no predictive ability at all. While not a tremendous increase, this increase suggests that the set of predictors 124 led to at least a marginal improvement in predicting a disposition favoring the plaintiff or defendant.
According to Peng et al., the next step in interpreting binary logistic regression analyses is an examination of each individual predictor variable's influence on the outcome. 125 As can be seen in Table 1 , the presiding judge's gender, race 126 , and their political affiliations' political party 127 had no individual statistically significant effects on disposition at the p<.05 or even p<.10 criteria.
Stated another way, none of these variables reliability predicted the disposition outcome. Based on the Wald criterion 131 , judge's age at the time of disposition was the only predictor on its own that reliably predicted whether a ruling favored the defendant or plaintiff. 132 More specifically, presiding judges who were older at the time of disposition were more likely to rule in the defendant's favor than the plaintiff's. The odds ratio B(exp) for age was .966, which reflects the change in the likelihood of favoring the plaintiff or defendant on the basis of a one-unit change in age (i.e., year). 133 Stated another way, for every year older a judge is, the odds of correctly predicting their decision for the defendant increases by approximately 3.40%. Overall, these results indicate that, of the predictor variables, only the judge's age at time of decision was a statistically significant predictor of their disposition.
Binary logistic regression is a multivariate procedure that analyzes multiple variables in the context of each other. 134 As a result, at times a relationship between a predictor and outcome can be influenced by the effects of other variables. 135 As judge's age at time of decision was found to be a significant predictor of disposition in the binary logistic regression, a series of independent samples t-tests was conducted for purely exploratory purposes to see if age differences existed across the other predictor variables. These analyses, although informative, cannot fully capture potential racial differences within the non-European-American/non-White category. For example, although both were included in the Republican category of political affiliation, Ronald Reagan appointed almost exclusively male (10, compared to 1 female) judges whereas George H.W. Bush was more gender balanced in appointing 8 males and 6 females. 151 Similarly, although both were included in non-European-American/non-White category of race and the same sample size, Asian-American judges were 5 times more likely to be female whereas Hispanic judges were three times more likely to be male.
IV. INTERPRETATIONS OF FINDINGS
The authors embarked on this research without a predetermined theory of what relationships between decisions and demographics would prove meaningful. The research attempted to measure statistically significant relationships between the identified demographics and the plaintiff/defendant favoring results in the selected Title VII cases, and despite some complexities related to mixed demographics, e.g. female and non-white, the research accurately analyzes the relevant subject. 153 Of course, the relationship between case outcomes and gender were of specific interest to the authors. As is noted above, the analysis of the sample did not find a statistically significant relationship between the case outcomes and race, gender, or political affiliation. 154 Thus, based on this study, we can say that non-white judges did not favor either plaintiff or defendant positions in ruling on dispositive motions under Rules 12(b)(6) or 56. 155 We can also say that male judges do not rule in a manner that shows a preference for defendants in gender-based discrimination cases brought under Title VII, at least not in the early stages of litigation, and that female judges do not favor plaintiffs in gender-based discrimination cases. will not impact the judge's ruling on the early dispositive motions that often determine the success of the plaintiff's case. However, the age of the presiding judge may impact the litigant's success.
A. FINDINGS REGARDING AGE
The research found a statistically significant relationship between the presiding judge's age and the favorable outcome to either plaintiff or defendant. 160 The research supports the supposition that a female litigant in a gender-based discrimination case is more likely to be successful at the 157 The authors note here the irony that occurs in this type of research when you approach the results from the bias of anticipating male judges to favor male defendants and female judges to favor female plaintiffs. This expectation contains its own implicit gender bias. a greater understanding of the plaintiff's claim or it may indicate less familiarity with common workplace issues. 170 Age may also indicate less familiarity with cultural changes, including changes in the workplace and in society involving the advancement of women. 171 As the law of Title VII demonstrates, what is acceptable behavior in the workplace has changed drastically over the past forty years with the evolution of actionable sexual harassment and gender discrimination cases. 172 Depending on the cases filed in a particular judicial district or the overall workload of a given federal district court, the presiding judge may or may not be experienced in handling Title VII cases. 173 However, overall increases in litigation under Title VII suggest that all federal judges appointed after 1970 would be more likely to have experience with Title VII gender discrimination cases, even in districts with less filings overall. 174 Thus, younger judges more recently appointed to the bench may be in a better position to assess a Title VII gender-discrimination case due to the prevalence of gender discrimination claims in federal court, and also due to personal experience in more gender diverse workplaces. 175 The impact of more recent workplace experience and other cross-cultural experiences would be present in both male and female judges, perhaps indicating why age is a more important comparative factor than gender.
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The theory of Third Generation Discrimination suggests that implicit bias in the judiciary can work to perpetuate workplace bias by using neutral procedural devices, such as the Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 motions, to dismiss Title VII bias-based gender discrimination cases. 177 The relevant finding here on age supports this theory. If the presiding federal judge lacks certain experiences that tend to reduce gender bias, such as work experience in a gender diverse workplace or experiences with opposite gender colleagues in professional and cultural environments without a power differential, the judge may put his or her own bias into the decision making process.
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The age of the judge, more than the judge's gender alone, may be an indicator of the judge's relevant experience with cross-gender interaction and resulting implicit biases. 179 This lack of experience leads to the same result that occurs in the workplace -the facially neutral decision favors the male-dominant group, inuring to the long-term benefit of the male-dominated majority. 180 The presiding judge measures the next bias-based gender discrimination case against the last and the self-perpetuating cycle of implicit bias continues. The import of the finding that age correlates to outcome is that aging is an ongoing process.
Despite some high profile exceptions, research indicates that Generation X and Millennials are more diverse, value diversity and operate comfortably in less structured and segregated environments. 181 Federal courts currently house judges from these generational groups and those numbers will only increase as the pool of appropriate candidates from post Baby Boom generations grows. 182 If what we currently know and hypothesize about the Millennial and Generation X populations holds true, we can expect the judiciary to not only be more diverse in gender, race, and viewpoint, but also to be able to approach gender-based discrimination cases with a greater self-awareness of the impact of bias.
It is tempting to cajole the finding that age correlates to defendant-favorable rulings in Title VII gender-based discrimination cases into an indictment of the appointed judiciary and the lifetime status of federal judges under Article III. 183 However, this study only examines judicial decisions in a certain type of gender-discrimination case, thus is too narrow to support theories for broader institutional changes. In fact, the study's findings on race, gender and political affiliation suggest the current appointment system results in some measure of fairness.
184 female litigant believes she cannot have fair treatment before a male judge, thus must shop her case to a female judge, eschewing other factors of forum choice, she is predisposed to believe that the judicial system also discriminates against her due to her status as a female. The success of her case then becomes a referendum on what judge presides rather than what facts and law control.
Secondly, any study of the judiciary is an institutional study. The best possible result of a study examining bias within the judiciary would be to find that judges, for the most part, do not employ personal biases when evaluating individual cases. In the federal system, where federal district court judges are appointed for a lifetime, findings of judicial bias implicate hundreds of cases as the judge will remain on the bench until death or retirement. 190 When a federal judge evaluates a discrimination case based on his or her own biases, the course of justice is perverted and the institution is harmed. Although this research is insufficient to assess the functioning and non-functioning biases of the entire federal judiciary, it does suggest that judges, despite race, gender, and political demographics, assess cases based on the arguments before the court rather than on preconceptions about gender, possibly even in bias-based discrimination cases.
CONCLUSION
Workplace discrimination is not a relic of past times. In fact, bias-based gender discrimination litigation or that female judges are more likely to rule in favor of female plaintiffs.
The study does suggest a female plaintiff should be wary of older judges, male or female, as those judges may be less able to understand the relevant theory of gender discrimination, especially when the case is premised on theories of implicit bias-based gender discrimination. As human beings, we are all subject to our biases, conscious and unconscious. But the breadth of human experience can work to ameliorate those biases. As we see increases in the appointment of younger, more diverse judges to the federal court bench, we have reason to be optimistic that those new jurists will bring different types of experiences to their decision-making.
* * *
